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The nature of the environment in which national human rights institutions (NHRIs) operate 
determines their effectiveness in building a human rights culture. NHRIs operating in a non-
democratic tradition reflect the system itself since the nature of the social, political and legal 
environment in such system contains informal constraints affecting their overall activities. 
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (Commission) was set up as part of democratic 
institutions following regime change in the early 1990s. It embarked on discharging functions 
vested in it in a framework that is not favorable for such institution to be effective. Lack of 
democratic tradition and good governance, poor culture of respect for human rights, weak 
institutions, and financial constraints are among the major hurdles limiting the effectiveness 
of the Commission. Against the prevailing environment, the article examines the effectiveness 
of the Commission in meeting its objectives on the basis of the evaluation of the practice of 
the Commission since it started its operation in 2004. Specifically, the performance of the 
Commission so far in the areas of promotion (sensitization and education) and protection 
(complaint-handling), and monitoring of human rights are reviewed to see if the institution is 
effective in defending human rights and thereby building good governance. After highlighting 
its success story, the major worrying trends and setbacks in developing a culture of respect for 
human rights and building good governance are explored. Before doing so, the article offers 
an overview of the establishment, structure, mandate and power of the Commission. Also, a 
concise statement on the linkage between the overall objectives of NHRIs in general and of 
the Commission in particular and good governance is offered to indicate that the institution is 
meant to serve as one of the institutional mechanisms to bring about good governance in the 
nation. 
 
1. Establishment of the Commission: Context and Process  
 
Regarding the mode of setting up, NHRIs can be established in three ways: by constitution (or 
amendment of constitution), by act of parliament, and by presidential decree.
1
 The setting up 
of NHRIs stipulated in constitutional text, represents the most powerful option as it 
guarantees the permanence of the institutions, is found in countries that have recently 
undergone constitutional reforms and are marked by grave human rights violations in the 
past.
2
  
 
Coming to Ethiopia, the evolution of the discourse on democracy, human rights, and 
democratic institutions in the country took place at a time of significant legal and political 
change. After a protracted armed struggle, the current ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) ousted the former military regime from power in 
1991 coinciding with the fall of the Socialist Camp and the resulting wave of democratization. 
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Issues of democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, and decentralization emerged as 
central ones after the demise of the military regime.
3
 The then transitional government 
undertook major transformative measures overhauling the political landscape, orientation, 
civil service, and economic policy of the nation aimed at redressing past injustices, atrocities 
and dire economic conditions amid high public expectations to usher in a new era.
4
   
 
Faced with the epic task of creating a foundation for a democratic system, those involved in 
crafting a new constitution looked to providing a rights-based constitution anchored in the 
rule of law and limited government. A set of provisions with human rights orientation was 
believed to play a central role in this regard. This justifies the due regard the Constitution of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) bestows to fundamental 
rights and freedoms.
5
 
 
Realizing that the existing courts cannot alone shoulder the protection of human rights, the 
framers of the Constitution agreed on the need for democratic institutions that can 
significantly contribute building democratic governance and accountability systems.
6
 The 
Commission was thus created as one of the rights-protective mechanisms as a response to a 
history of authoritarian rule in general and a notorious military dictatorship in particular that 
caused immense carnage.
7
  
 
Compared to other legislation, the process of enacting the enabling statute of the Commission 
and the Ombudsman Institute is unprecedented considering a wider public and expert 
participation amid heightened public expectation.
8
 Specifically, it involved an input of 
international experts and practitioners of NHRIs, public discussion throughout the country on 
draft legislation and workshop of local experts on it.
9
 Drawing on this, Parliament eventually 
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enacted the enabling legislation of the Commission, Proclamation No. 210/2000, in 2000 
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nomination of the Chief Commissioner took place only in July 2004 and of the other two 
Commissioners a year later. The delay in the enactment of the legislation and appointment of 
officials was attributed to the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000) that diverted the attention of 
the government to issues of maintaining national security.
10
 On top of the war, the process 
was stalled by political and bureaucratic procedures.
11
 
 
Although the Commission’s enabling legislation involved a broad-based consultation of the 
general public and experts, both local and international human rights NGOs were excluded 
from the consultation, triggering criticism.
12
 Despite this, the setting up of the Commission 
can be regarded as willingness on the part of the government to change the complex human 
rights situation in the country.
13
 Because an apparent lack of appropriate social and political 
action and determination to condemn and sanction social norms abusive of human rights has 
been of concern in the country for a long time.
14
  
 
Upon its establishment, there was high expectation of what the Commission would offer. This 
is unsurprising in a nation where the immense violation of dignity of citizens at the hands of 
the brutal military junta was still fresh in the memory of millions of people. Whether the 
Commission has lived up to that expectation is evident from the discussion on its success 
story and setbacks, beginning from section 5. 
 
2. Structure of the Commission 
 
Both a statutory and constitutional body, the Commission is an independent autonomous 
institution accountable to Parliament (the House of People’s Representatives). Compared to 
NHRIs elsewhere, it is a relatively small institution, composed of a Chief Commissioner, a 
Deputy Chief Commissioner and a Commissioner for Children and Women, and other 
commissioners as may be deemed necessary, and the necessary personnel.
15
 Given the large 
number of ethnic groups in the country, coupled with limited posts for officials, one may not 
obviously expect the Commission to replicate such diversity at a time.  
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16
 Apart from advancing the promotion and protection of human rights at the 
local level, the decentralization has enhanced the Commission’s staff diversity and pluralism 
as local staff and local vernaculars are used to conduct their respective activities.
17
 While 
regional offices mean better access, physical access remains a barrier for much of the rural 
population.  
 
The Proclamation provides a number of rules guaranteeing the institutional independence of 
the Commission in terms of allocation of funding, and appointment and dismissal of and 
immunity to its officials.
18
 Other guarantees of independence in the form of its authority to 
recruit, and employ staff and to adopt working rules and procedures are provided under the 
legislation.
19
  
 
Generally, the Proclamation meets, at least theoretically, the requirement of the Paris 
Principles regarding the independence of NHRIs. The issue is, however, whether the officials 
appointed to run the institution are, in practice, truly independent of party politics and the 
executive while discharging their functions. This is significant given the fact that the country 
did not, to a large extent, have institutions that were and are capable of functioning 
independently of the government of the day.
20
 That apparently is why scepticism was raised at 
the very inception of the Commission, as regards the independence of the first officials that 
assumed office.
21
  
 
Although apparently in full compliance with the Paris Principles, the Commission is not 
accredited as yet. Its attempt to get accredited commenced in 2010. It was supposed to submit 
its application along with requisite documents for accreditation purpose but failed to act 
within a schedule fixed by the International Coordination Committee of National Human 
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Rights Institutions (ICC).
22
 Its second application was scheduled for scrutiny by ICC in 
November 2012 but has been deferred for one year.
23
 
 
3. Mandate and Power of the Commission 
 
NHRIs are usually commissioned to carry out, among others, promotion, information, 
documentation, education, research on human rights, and protection.
24
 As provided under 
Article 6 of the Proclamation, the Commission has a very broad mandate to promote and 
protect human rights.
25
 It does not have the power to scrutinize alleged human rights 
violations pending before the House of People’ Representatives, the House of Federation, or 
courts of law at any level.
26
  
 
The Commission is empowered to investigate complaints, upon individual complaints or suo 
moto.
27
 The rules on filing a complaint to the Commission make it easy for complainants to 
access it as the Commission can be moved to take action by a complainant in person or by 
someone on his/her behalf orally or in written form or other means.
28
 A complaint may be 
lodged, free of charge, in the working language of the Commission, which is Amharic, or in 
any other language.
29
 The simplicity of the rule to bring a complaint to the attention of the 
Commission is meant to mitigate the formality of procedures that could limit access to courts. 
 
The Commission is given a range of powers to investigate a complaint submitted to it, 
including the investigative power of subpoena, giving it theoretically adequate powers 
necessary for the examination of a complaint.
30
 Any person asked to appear for the purpose of 
furnishing information or production of document or record should cooperate with the 
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25
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26
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27
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29
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30
  The Commission is empowered to compel the attendance of a witness to give testimony, or force the 
production of evidence by those in possession of them (Article 25 of the Proclamation). 
Commission. Failure to act accordingly constitutes offence and punishable by sentence and/or 
fine.
31
  
 
The Commission is, as a matter of general rule, supposed to settle complaints through 
amicable means, seeking an agreement between the parties (Article 26(1)). A limited number 
of cases may not be subject to such means
32
. Emphasis on amicable means of settlement 
reflects the reality regarding dispute resolution in the country. The fact that more than 84 % of 
the population lives in rural areas where the traditional system has a strong authority on 
individual as well as communal matters makes the reflection of such system in the 
Commission’s power significant. 
 
Made in an advisory capacity, the Commission’s opinions and recommendations are not 
legally binding. It is not explicitly authorized to initiate court proceedings either in its own 
name or on behalf of an aggrieved party either.
33
  
 
The enforcement mechanisms it uses to ensure compliance are to publicize, be it in its annual 
or special report as may be necessary, and to finally report to the parliament on its 
recommendations in particular and on its overall activities in general.
34
 Another instrument of 
enforcement is a criminal sanction. Serving to strengthen its enforcement powers, a penalty 
prescribed by the enabling legislation may also serve as an incentive to the Commission’s 
autonomy.
35
 In addition, it may collaborate with other organs, for instance, media and NGOs, 
to mount pressure on government authorities to heed its opinions. 
 
4. NHRIs and Good Governance – Linking the Mandate of the Commission with 
Good Governance 
 
Governance is all about exercising government powers to manage a nation’s economic, 
political and administrative affairs. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions by 
which power and authority is exercised in a society by which the government, the private 
sector, citizens’ groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their 
legal rights and obligations.
36
 An essential attribute of democracy is good governance. The 
notion is coined by international financial institutions as a pre-condition to get loans in order 
to strengthen governance systems in developing countries.
37
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The notion is broad and capable of conveying different meanings. An expansive 
understanding of good governance helps to recognize the mandate of NHRIs and how they 
should function
38
. Good governance includes, as Reif lists down, numerous practices such as: 
elimination of corruption in government, a predictable, transparent and accountable 
administration, democratic decision-making, the supremacy of the rule of law, effective 
protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a fair economic system, and appropriate 
devolution and decentralization of government.
39
 Obviously, NHRIs play a vital role in 
developing good governance, at least, in checking the exercise of government authority and in 
protecting human rights. However, there is also another way of looking at the relationship 
between NHRIs and good governance. Although NHRIs play a crucial role in building good 
governance, they should also reflect the very elements of good governance in their overall 
activities. As they are meant serve as a ‘watchdog’ against government actions and thereby 
build good governance, they ought to adhere to the same principles of good governance in 
their overall undertakings.
40
 
 
As part of the democratic institutions, the Commission checks, among others, the exercise of 
government authority and thereby safeguards fundamental rights. As such, it serves as an 
accountability mechanism to ensure that government powers are exercised in such a way that 
they respect and protect human rights. 
 
Although framed in terms of human rights promotion and protection, the overall objective of 
the Commission is thus meant to limit arbitrary and open-ended discretionary actions and 
policy implementation by government authorities. 
 
5. The Commission’s Modest Achievements 
 
The Commission went operational in full swing in 2005. Since then, it has been trying to 
promote and protect human rights by undertaking various activities. Its modest achievement 
lies in its bid to offer remedies in labour cases, addressing claims related to group rights, 
provision of legal counsel (particularly to vulnerable groups), monitoring of detention 
facilities, and sensitization of human rights. The success story of the Commission outlined 
here is not exhaustive but is meant to accentuate the major ones. 
 
5. 1. Investigation of Complaints and Provision of Remedies - Ensuring Accountability 
in the Private Sphere 
 
The Commission is empowered to deal with claims of human rights abuses perpetrated by 
government authorities and its agents (vertical application of human rights) as well as 
allegation of violations in the private sector (horizontal application of human rights). The 
Commission’s success lies in the latter and its limitation in the former is to be discussed in 
section 7. 
 
While the Commission is said to be fully operational in 2005, it started exercising its quasi-
judicial function of investigating complaints in 2006. There is a steady growth in the number 
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of cases submitted to the Commission over the years following the Commission’s promotion 
campaigns to raise awareness about itself and human rights.
41
 However, the total number of 
files of complaints submitted to the Commission since its inception which until April 2013 
exceeds a little over 6.000 is rather small given the sheer size of the country and its poor 
human rights records.
42
 At the outset, it is important to note that the exact number of 
complaints submitted to the Commission in general is difficult to come by. This is largely 
attributable to the poor file management and recording of cases prior to 2010, before the 
Commission reformed its business process. The reform resulted in, among others, rearranging 
the original departments and also created new sections and posts, one of which is the 
Registrar at the Investigation Directorate.
43
 One can observe an improvement in the delivery 
of services in general and file management in particular after the Registrar went operational.
44
 
 
The recent statistics indicates a marked increase in the number of cases submitted to the 
Commission. More than 1.427 complaints submitted to the Commission in 2012/2013, even 
before the end of the Ethiopian fiscal year, represent an even greater increase over the 65 
cases received in its first year of operation.
45
 
 
Broadly catalogued, the types of cases submitted to the Commission since it commenced 
discharging its functions are over issues of employment-related matters, interpersonal land 
disputes, property, security of person, freedom of movement, equality and non-discrimination, 
conditions of detention in prisons and police stations, inter-ethnic conflicts, election-related 
issues, and forced eviction from land and house.
46
 
Employment-related complaints account for the bulk of complaints filed to the Commission 
annually. A substantial proportion of these complaints involve complaints against employers 
such as NGOs, church, state-owned enterprises, and individual citizens. The contents of these 
complaints relate primarily to employees’ complaints against their respective employers of 
unfairness in promotions, transfers, benefits and privileges, dismissal, and release.  
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42
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43
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45
  See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 2012/2013, 18 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Annual Report 2012/2013’). 
46
  Inaugural Report, supra note 41, op. cit., 89-96; Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 
2011/2012, 22 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 2011/2012’); see also Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, A Consolidated Five Year Report, 20011, 36 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Consolidated Five 
Year Report’). 
Coming to the object of complaints, it is interesting to note that a significant number of 
labour-related complaints involved state - owned enterprises. Although the government has 
gradually been privatizing them following the adoption of a market-oriented economic policy, 
State - owned enterprises still employ a considerable number of workers. It is thus not 
suspiring to see a substantial portion of employment-related complaints coming from such 
enterprises. 
 
It also is important to note that the Orthodox Church features high in employment-related 
complaints that keep on coming to the attention of the Commission time and again. In fact, 
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are competent to deal with employment-related matters 
against the Church as the employees of religious faith that are engaged in non-spiritual 
activities are covered by the Labour Code.
47
 A ruling made by the Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court confirmed this in a landmark decision that would serve as a precedent 
to all other similar cases in the lower courts.
48
  
 
Complaints involving the Orthodox Church keep on steady rise before the Commission as a 
result of the Church’s increased business stakes. The Church has been engaged in commercial 
activities, notably massive construction of buildings to rent out to customers, which generate 
considerable revenue. The revenue from its stake in commercial ventures has frequently been 
cited as the main source of pervasive corruption and rivalry in the Church, eroding its spiritual 
aspect.
49
  
 
Cognisant of the gravity of complaints involving the Church, the Commission held 
discussions with the Synodos, the highest decision-making body within the Orthodox Church, 
on the way to handle such matters in the future and also managed to get some employees 
reinstated.
50
 
 
Marking its success story, remedies indicated in the Commission’s recommendations on 
labour matter have at times been quickly executed. The rationale for this has partly to do with 
the Commission’s stance towards private entities. When complaints are lodged against private 
entities, the Commission tends to be aggressive and toils hard to ensure compliance.  
 
Also, socio-political tradition partly offers broader explanation as to why private entities on 
their part heed the Commission’s recommendation. Government authorities are considered to 
have an absolute power and whim to make decisions that the subjects have to abide by. Fear 
of governmental agencies and the perceived implication of not observing the outcome of the 
exercise of their powers might have forced private respondents to obey the Commission’s 
opinions although they may not agree with them.  
 
The fact that the Commission has been providing redress, particularly in labour cases, to 
claimants appearing before it means that the institution is contributing its part in ensuring the 
accountability of private entities to the laws of the land.  
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5.2. Monitoring Prison and Detention Facilities 
 
One of the Commission’s most laudable performances lies in the improvement of prison 
conditions in the country. Through monitoring mission, the Commission helped in 
introducing improvements to sub-standard prison and detention facilities in the country. 
  
As they are prone to abuses, it is the duty of States to provide both independent inspection of 
places of detention and imprisonment, and effective complaints procedures for victims of 
human rights violations that occurred in such places.
51
 The monitoring of detention facilities 
is thus made with a view to making recommendations to change conditions in order to help 
prevent the incidence of torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment, and ensure humane treatment of detainees.
52
 The inspection provides NHRIs 
early warning signals of human rights challenges in such places as well as opportunity to 
assess the extent to which human rights are being respected in them.  
 
The Ethiopian Constitution guarantees the rights of prisoners and persons under detention.
53
 
Although the Commission is not explicitly authorized to monitor detention facilities unlike in 
other jurisdictions, it, at least, falls under its broad mandate.
54
 
 
The Commission has been carrying out nation-wide monitoring of prisons and detention 
centres to assess the human rights conditions of prisoners and detainees and to ensure that the 
conditions therein meet minimum international standards. It carried out successful visits to 
most places of detention and prisons in the country. In doing so, it was provided with the 
resources and help needed for effective coverage and assessment of these facilities, and 
finally released its reports, one at the Federal and nine at State levels.
55
 The Commission has, 
by conducting the inspection, considerably assisted in improving the prisoners’ and detainees’ 
human rights in detention and protective facilities.
56
 Even prior to the release of a final report, 
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  Ahmed Hussen, expert, Human Rights Enforcement and Monitoring Directorate, said that this is the case 
with prisons in Somali National Regional State (Interview on 18 September 2011, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia); 
see the Inaugural Report, supra note 44, op. cit., 98; see also the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, 
Annual Report 2007/2008, 7 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Annual Report 2007/2008’). 
some prisons have, for instance, increased budget allocated for meal to a prisoner per day, 
facilitating the provision of better food to prisoners, following the inspection and discussion 
with other government officials on the need to improve the conditions of prisoners.
57
 
Eventually, the Commission organized a consultation round-table over the reports where 
representatives from various prison centres and other officials participated on ways to 
implement the recommendations incorporated in the report.
58
 
 
It is remarkable that the Commission carried out the monitoring based on the international 
human rights principles relevant to prison conditions and the human rights of prisoners and 
detainees.
59
 The utilization of international standards by the Commission in conducting the 
monitoring has injected the relevant international principles and practice into the domestic 
law.  
Although the impact of prison inspection and monitoring is positive, it has not resolved all 
problems facing detainees, which evidently requires a major overhaul in the justice sector. 
 
5.3. Endeavour to Rectify Constraints in the Application of International Human 
Rights Instruments 
 
In their role as promoter of human rights, NHRIs are responsible for spreading awareness of 
human rights with a view to inculcating a culture of human rights and to bring about social 
change in this respect. 
 
The most preventive strategy for human rights violations would comprise the introduction of 
human rights education in primary and secondary education as well as targeted education for 
professional groups, including lawyers, judges, police and civil servants in key positions.
60
 
 
Within government, a particularly important target for training is the judiciary. A campaign of 
education and awareness for judges is one of the most important steps an NHRI can take to 
enhance its own effectiveness.
61
 The judiciary is instrumental in the enforcement of human 
rights and judges need to be made fully aware of their responsibilities in this regard. This is 
particularly important in Ethiopia where there remains little concern for and/or limited 
application of international human rights standards by the judiciary, even of treaties which the 
nation has ratified. Lawyers and judges tend to avoid invoking and applying human rights 
provisions of the Constitution and international human rights norms. 
 
One of the workshops organised by the Commission on the role of the judiciary is related to 
the application of international human rights at the domestic level.  The Commission 
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Conference of NHRIs for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008, 5. 
conducted a consultation workshop on the status of international human rights treaties under 
the Ethiopian legal system and the role of the judiciary in enforcing international human 
rights treaties ratified by the country.
62
 The aim of the consultation was to sort out loopholes 
and find out ways for the application of human rights instruments in the administration of 
justice sector in general and the judiciary in particular.
63
 It was a remarkable meeting as it was 
attended by those directly concerned with the enforcement of human rights and others who 
play a crucial role in this regards - the attendees included the President of the High Court and 
other senior judges, public prosecutors, legal experts drawn from government agencies, 
academic institutions and civil society organizations.
64
  
 
Following the workshop, the Commission took a concrete step to facilitate the actual 
implementation of treaties by the judiciary. It teamed up with a local NGO, Action 
Professionals’ Association for the People (APAP), to help parliament ratify international 
treaties in such a way that they could easily be applied by the judiciary and thereby rectified a 
longstanding obstacle in law-making procedure that has impeded their application by the 
judiciary.
65
 All international human rights instruments ratified by the country are supposed to 
go through a proper national law-making procedure to overcome such constraints in 
implementing them at the national level. This will assist in the invoking of international 
treaties by courts as it helps to rectify constraints in domesticating international human rights 
instruments and to tone down institutional resistance to their application.
66
  
 
5.4.  Attempt to Integrate Human Rights in School Curricula 
 
Human rights education may take the form of non-formal trainings and also encompass 
integrating human rights into the formal curricula of schools and higher academic institutions. 
In relation to education, the Commission has been striving to make human rights education 
part of the school system with the aim introducing pupils of primary schools to fundamental 
rights values very early in their lives. 
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The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights called upon states to have human rights as 
subjects in the curricula of all learning institutions in formal as well as non-formal settings.
67
 
NHRIs may provide assistance to states in implementing this objective.
68
 A significant 
education work undertaken by the Commission, in collaboration with donor agencies, is its 
bid to incorporate the notion of human rights into the primary school curriculum. To this end, 
it has engaged expert consultants, who carried out a detailed study of the status of and gaps in 
the incorporation of human rights into the primary school curriculum.
69
 After a series of 
discussions on the findings of the study, the Commission forged an agreement with the 
Ministry of Education to implement a project to adequately reflect human rights in primary 
education.
70
 A pilot project was, as a result, implemented at more than 90 primary schools.
71
 
The evaluation and monitoring of the pilot project was carried so that the project would be 
implemented across all primary schools in the Country.
72
  
 
Furthermore, to reinforce its work in education system, the Commission has recently 
embarked on examining the human rights situation in high schools. It has launched an inquiry 
into high schools to determine whether conditions in schools are human rights-friendly. It 
selected some high schools as samples for the inquiry, concluded the collection of data and 
did an analysis of the information gathered.
73
 The objective of the inquiry is to provide advice 
to the government to address loopholes and problems hampering a human rights-friendly 
atmosphere in high schools.
74
  
 
To strengthen the incorporation of human rights in the school system, the Commission plans 
to incorporate human rights in all schools, from Kindergarten up to University, that will be 
completed in 2015/2016.
75
  
 
The attempt to integrate human rights into schools will create a significant headway to 
inculcating human rights in the minds of children and adults and to endeavour to build a 
human rights culture. 
 
5.5. Promotion of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups and Provision of Legal Counsel 
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  See the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Strategic Plan 2011-2016, 54 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Strategic Plan 2011-2016’). 
Another success story of the Commission lies in its promotion of rights, particularly of 
vulnerable groups. It has given due emphasis to efforts to promote the notion of human rights 
in general and those of women in particular, keeping them in public discourse gradually. This 
is a commendable move given the widespread ignorance of human rights and of gender equity 
in the country. Such endeavour to enhance knowledge and awareness of human rights has a 
positive effect not only on the better protection of human rights but also on the process of 
political liberalisation in the medium to long term.
76
 
 
Access to justice is a human right in and of itself with a far-reaching impact on claiming other 
rights. Without access to justice, the poor are unable to claim and realize a whole range of 
human rights, or challenge abuses or violations committed against them.
77
 Perpetuating their 
disadvantage, financial, social and physical barriers are among the major factors hindrances 
facing the poor to accessing the justice system.
78
  
 
Provision of free legal assistance by NHRIs helps the poor to access justice, removing 
financial and information obstacles hampering them from doing so. NHRIs should thus 
promote and facilitate complainant’s access to their rights and remedies, including the ones 
offered by themselves and remedies that exist elsewhere. They have a duty not only to inform 
complainants of their rights and potential remedies but also to help them through the process 
as they are meant to serve the interest of those who may have experienced human rights 
abuses.
79
 Such service is particularly important for vulnerable groups who are likely to live in 
poverty. After all one of the effectiveness parameters of NHRIs is their ability to meet the 
needs of groups in society who are at risk of human rights violations.
80
 
 
The Commission has been providing legal counsel and aid to poor litigants despite lack of 
explicit reference to it by the enabling statute.
81
 In order to realize the provision of pro bono 
services, the Commission has teamed up with local NGOs and universities in different parts of 
the country and provided financial support to more than 111 centres established in different 
parts of the country for such purpose.
82
  
 
Apart from expanding accessibility, the major objective of establishing these centres is to 
help, particularly, the vulnerable groups of the society - women, children, persons with 
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disability, the destitute, the elderly, and people living with HIV/AIDS gain access to free legal 
aid services.
83
 With the help of such Centres the Commission has provided information on 
legal and institutional solutions to complainants and also actually assisted the victims in 
receiving effective remedies from courts. In 2012, a total of 7.872 indigent people (60 % 
women and 40 % men) and in 2013, a total of 13.867 of them (of which 6.208 were women) 
have benefited from the services of the legal aid centres across the country.
84
 Most of the 
cases submitted to the legal aid centres relate to family (maintenance and divorce cases), 
labour and land use issues and the services provided include writing of statement of claim, 
defence and appeal, legal counselling and representation in courts.
85
 
 
Aside from providing legal counsel, the Centres also serve as points for funnelling complaints 
to the Commission, improving its accessibility. The Centres enhance not only the access to 
justice for the most disadvantaged strata in society but also simultaneously develop the 
capacities of future legal practitioners who are studying law and serve in the Centres.
86
 
The launching of legal aid centres, in collaboration with universities, NGOs and donor 
agencies, for vulnerable groups is one of the main milestones of the Commission. The Centres 
have been benefiting increasing number of indigent complainants to access justice and 
thereby defend their rights. Given the fact that many Ethiopians could not seek justice owing 
to financial impediments, complex legal procedures of formal courts and illiteracy, the move 
to set up such centres is significant in helping to overcome the problem. 
 
Although a commendable initiative, the fate of those centres is at stake as they are wholly 
dependent on donors’ funding that ended last year. The DIP program under the auspices of the 
UNDP that has been crucial in capacity building of the Commission ended in 2012. Given its 
meagre resources, the Commission is not likely to retain most of them. 
 
5.6. Initiative to Formulate a National Human Rights Action Plan 
 
As the name itself implies, a National Human Rights Action Plan maps out a set of practical 
goals designed to guide the national human rights policies of a country. Its aim is to enable 
states to comprehensively address any shortcomings regarding the promotion and protection 
of human rights in a nation. Underscoring its importance, the concept of the national action 
plan was recommended and adopted by participating states at the Vienna World Conference.
87
  
 
The Commission has spearheaded attempts to come up with the Plan, the first of its kind in 
the nation’s history. In close collaboration with other government agencies, the first draft of 
the Action Plan was completed and presented for discussion. Following endorsement by the 
Council of Ministers, it finally was adopted by Parliament.
88
 The Commission’s engagement 
starts from the very initiation of the idea of formulating it to the actual work in finalizing its 
text.
89
 Its role is not limited to the formulation of the Plan. The Chief Commissioner of the 
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Commission is appointed as a member of the national committee to follow-up the 
implementation of the Plan.
90
  
 
The Plan does not refer to nor contain any recommendation as regards the role of the 
Commission in implementing it unlike, for instance, Sri Lanka.
91
 Normally, monitoring its 
implementation falls within the competence of the Commission. Notwithstanding explicit 
reference to it, the Commission really took a pragmatic step in providing leadership for such 
Plan that would offer a more holistic and concerted approach in the implementation of human 
rights and building a culture of respect for human rights. It provides a framework by which 
government authorities will be measured with respect to the observance and fulfilment of 
human rights. Its implementation thus provides an opportunity for alignment of state 
behaviour with human rights norms and standards, contributing to the endeavour to build 
good governance in the nation. 
 
5.7. Assistance in Submission of Periodic State Reports 
 
The Commission was involved in attempts to submit Ethiopia’s country reports due under 
international and regional human rights ratified by the Country. The record of Ethiopia in 
submitting such periodic reports is not good. The country was overdue on several of its 
reporting obligations to treaty bodies while others have been submitted late (CRC and 
CEDAW). The Commission, in collaboration with stakeholders, commissioned the task to 
submit all outstanding periodic reports, solicited funding for the project, organized necessary 
training on treaty reporting, developed term of reference for reporting, and employed staff and 
consultants supervising the project, and finally completed the project.
92
 All the 19 reports due 
were finalized and submitted to the respective monitoring bodies, including the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
93
 
 
While there is nothing inherently wrong in rendering such assistance, the Commission may 
risk being too closely identified with the government. Its role as an independent monitoring 
body may also be affected as it has actively taken part in work on government reports rather 
than issuing its own independent report or offering opinion on such report, negating its 
mandate in this respect. Normally, the responsibility for preparing national reports to the UN 
treaty bodies lies with the executive organ (particularly Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
Encouraging the government to hand in delayed reports, which is worth credit, is one thing 
and taking part in the work is another matter.  
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6. Worrying Actions and Set-backs 
 
The Commission’s failures and worrying actions are the subject of scrutiny in this section. 
The discussion here reveals that the Commission failed to contribute its part to the good 
governance building initiative or that it failed to abide by some aspects of the same. 
 
6.1. Failure to Investigate Allegations of Human Rights Abuses attributable to 
Government Authorities: Lack of Accountability of Public Authorities 
 
As a quasi-judicial body, the Commission serves to check the exercise of government and 
thereby hold the government to account. However, the practice, as discussed below, indicates 
that the Commission is far from meetings accountability duties over public authorities. 
 
The Commission investigates individual complaints by persons and entities in both the public 
and private sectors. Concerning the trend of investigation, the number of cases settled through 
full investigation and mediation processes is a fraction of cases declined. Investigation of 
complaints is thus an exception rather than the norm. The Commission declined to investigate 
cases for varies reasons, among others, lack of mandate, accounting for the largest portion, 
triviality of matters, and court ruling on subject-matter of complaints. Most of the Complaints 
declined were referred for resolution to appropriate bodies, including courts, the Ombudsman 
and the very agencies subject to complaints.  
 
The Commission appears to be more comfortable with the protection of human rights where 
the issues involved do not have political overtones and are politically not sensitive. Instead of 
focusing on monitoring government entities and checking on government abuses, it, in other 
words, invested its energy in private complaints and violent conflict. This is the case where 
the objects of complaints relate to non-governmental entities, and where public authorities 
(officials) are not directly implicated in areas such as labour and conflict.  
 
Indeed, the Commission investigated some cases it considers important and sensitive by 
dispatching ad hoc committees, especially when claims and counter-claims are made over 
some issues that grab headlines in the country. It has not managed to apply the same scheme 
consistently, however. It failed to investigate issues that equally raise serious questions of 
human rights and clutched the attention of the media, opposition parties, human rights NGOs, 
both national and international, and the public in general. Where issues involved in a 
complaint have political overtones, it seems to disclaim competence to handle them. Two 
cases signalling fear harboured by the Commission to examine such sensitive matter are 
informative.  
 
6.1.1. The Gambella Case 
 
In the last couple of years, Ethiopia has been handing out huge tracts of land to foreign 
investors drawn from different countries including India, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti. As a 
result, Ethiopia has frequently been cited as one of the countries where ‘land-grabbing’ is 
occurring. In many instances, local communities were allegedly driven out of their ancestral 
land to give way to commercial farming allegedly without prior consultation with the affected 
communities and/or adequate compensation. One case over such allegations was brought to 
the attention of the Commission. Unfortunately, the institution failed to see its merit. 
 
The Commission rejected, for want of jurisdiction, an interesting complaint filed by a 
representative of people living in a protected forest that could have given rise to important 
human rights issues, such as forced evictions from house and land, the right to work and 
means of livelihood, and environmental protection.
94
 The Complaint was instituted by Tamiru 
Ambello, acting on behalf of the community living in the area, to challenge the decision of the 
Gambella National Regional State, which decided to hand the forest area over to an investor 
for the purpose of tea farming.
95
 They alleged that they were not consulted before the decision 
was made and also that the clearing of the forest to give way to tea farming would have a 
devastating impact on the environment as well as their livelihood based on the forest. Their 
attempt to get the remedy of injunction from the local administration and regional government 
institutions was in vain.  
 
Upon learning that the investor had already cleared a sizeable chunk of the forest, they 
submitted a written request to the President of the country to intervene in the matter and help 
them halt the clearing of the forest. Sympathetic with their case, the President asked the 
Commission to intervene and investigate their complaint. They submitted their complaint to 
the Commission along with the letter of the President and other supporting documents. The 
investigation team at the Commission accepted the case but needed, before launching 
investigation, a professional advice on environmental issues at stake in the case and put their 
request informally to some experts and local organizations working on environmental issues 
such as Pact Ethiopia and Forum for Environment. The experts and the organizations asked 
the investigators to make a formal request, i.e. to produce a written letter of the Commission. 
The leadership of the Commission refused to issue a formal letter on the ground that the case 
does not fall within the purview of the Commission and ordered a referral of the case to the 
Ombudsman Institute, which in its turn remanded the case back to the Commission. In the 
end, both institutions failed to deal with the case. 
 
There is no provision that precludes the Commission, and the Ombudsman as well, from 
investigating such complaint as it is not considered by courts and other institutions.
96
 The 
Commission’s action contravenes its obligations under the enabling statute to investigate any 
complaint related to human rights violations so long as the matter is not pending before other 
organs. Perhaps, the leadership of the Commission, as well as that of the Ombudsman, feels 
that the issues involved in the case pits them against the policy of the government to transfer a 
large-scale land to investors on the one hand and allegations of the so called ‘land-grabbing’ 
for which the Ethiopian government has been criticized by experts and international 
organizations on the other.
97
 The government appears to be very sensitive on matters of 
allocation of massive swathes of land to foreign investors, denying that ‘land-grabbing’ has 
taken place. It argues that its action is part of its long-term bid for economic development, to 
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Review of the Impacts and the Possible Policy Response, 2011. 
attract foreign investment and technology transfer, to spur employment opportunity, and to 
help eradicate hunger and thereby ensure food self-sufficiency.
98
 The Commission seems to 
realize the sensitivities of the case and might have decided not to confront the government by 
investigating it, constituting a self-imposed restraint.  
 
6.1.2.  The Gura Farda Case 
 
The Commission was tight-lipped over the recent forced eviction of thousands of people from 
the Gurafarda, situated in the Southern part of the country. The South Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples’ Regional State evicted thousands of people who were accused of illegally 
occupying land without permit, causing deforestation and damaging the ecosystem. As a 
result, many of the victims claimed to have been evicted without advance notice and time to 
even collect their personal belongings let alone agricultural produce. Some of them even 
alleged to have been forcibly loaded onto trucks and buses and dropped in Addis Ababa, from 
where they were finally sent to the place of their origin, situated in some part of the Amhara 
National Regional State. The action of the government caused furry among human rights 
NGOs, both local and international, and the opposition parties operating both locally and 
abroad, becoming a headline issue for some time.
99
 Some people go so far as portraying the 
action as part of a ‘systemic attack’ singling out the Amhara people.100 During Parliamentary 
session, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi angrily denied such accusation. He argued that 
it was a simple act to deter people from flocking to the area illegally and pointed out that 
settlement from one State to another had to be coordinated between the two States 
involved.
101
 Bolstering the argument of the Federal government, the local administration 
pointed out that those evicted were the ones who settled in the area illegally after 2005 and the 
ones who arrived before that period had already been given permission to settle.
102
 
 
Some of the victims of the eviction lodged a group complaint to the Commission, alleging 
that the eviction was arbitrary, that they were subjected to violence and lost their entire 
fortune. Apparently fearing the sensitivities involved in the matter, the Commission refrained 
from taking any action on the case. By the same token, the Commission also failed to act on 
individual complaints from some of the victims in the case at hand but opted to refer the 
matter to the Ombudsman, disclaiming jurisdiction over the case. 
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The rejection of Gambella and Gurafarda cases begs the question of whose interest the 
Commission is serving. Actually, it negates the very underpinning for the establishment of the 
institution. 
 
Respect for and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of the FDRE constitution. The 
Commission is one of the institutional means to realize this. The basic rationale for its 
establishment is to achieve a permanent shift from the autocratic polities of the past to a just 
and democratic political arrangement in which the supremacy of law and good governance 
flourishes.
103
 The institution is thus meant to serve as the frontline mainstay for ensuring that 
the new status quo does not slide back to the human rights abuses of the past by seeing to it 
that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens remain the constant centre of all 
developmental endeavours being made.
104
 Quite contrary to its inherent objective, the failure 
of the Commission to investigate the cases means that it failed to test whether the 
development policy of the government is in line with human rights ethos espoused by the 
Constitution. 
 
6.2. Failure to Advice the Government on Legislation Pertaining to Human Rights 
Issues 
 
The Commission is authorized to provide recommendation to the government on existing and 
proposed legislation, and formulation of policies as well as advice on government reports to 
international human rights monitoring bodies.
105
 Such tasks could contribute to attempts to 
build democratic governance. 
 
The Commission has not done much work in the area of advising the government on 
legislation and polices on human rights issues.
106
 Recognizing its shortcoming in this respect, 
the Commission made a guideline on how to go about carrying such function and intend to 
engage in carrying it out.
107
 Although not specified, the Commission intends, as per its new 
strategic plan, to make a total of 55 recommendations on different human rights issues over 
the coming five years.
108
 
 
The Commission’s silence relating to two piece of legislation is likely to baffle an observer. 
The promulgation of the Charities and Societies Proclamation and the anti-terrorism 
legislation involved much controversy and engendered heated-debate, with some accusing the 
government of using legislation to stifle dissent while others allege that they contradict the 
human rights norms of the Constitution and international human rights instruments ratified by 
the country.
109
 Despite such allegation, the Commission failed to probe the compatibility of 
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these laws with both national and international human rights standards. Its failure to advice 
the government on these laws marks its inability to fulfil one of its key functions. Most 
importantly, it denotes failure to advice the government on important issues confronting 
human rights, highlighting its fear to confront the government on sensitive matters. Actually, 
it embarked on reviewing one of them (the anti-terrorism law) in order to advice the 
government to determine whether it complies with national and international human rights 
commitments, but backed off for unknown reason.
110
  
  
6.3. Frosty and Testy Relationships with NGOs 
 
The ability of the Commission to get the trust and confidence of the public and civil society 
and other bodies is important to foster its work as well as societal legitimacy. As its mandate 
is broad and its accessibility is limited it is imperative to develop partnership with civil 
society organizations. Realizing this, the Commission has attempted to establish relationships 
with civil society organizations, academic institutions, and faith-based organizations. To 
cement its links with civil society organizations, the Commission put in place procedures 
regulating cooperation with NGOs.  
 
Cooperation with NGOs involves aspects of participation by civil society in government 
undertakings. The shortcoming of the Commission in this respect means that the institution 
has not been able to implement the principle of good governance in its own operation. 
 
At the outset, its engagement with NGOs was selective, involving few NGOs regarded as 
non-confrontational, and the subject of cooperation was also limited to legal aid issues. 
Nonetheless, the Commission’s collaboration with Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRC) 
and Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers Association (EWLA), two of the prominent human rights 
defenders that have perennially estranged relation with the government is remarkable.
111
 Such 
partnership helps to mitigate the rancour between the government and NGOs and facilitate 
rapprochement between them. 
 
Following the adoption of a comprehensive memorandum of understanding with the help of 
some civil society organizations, the partnership will extend to projects involving campaigns 
to promote human rights and to conduct research on human rights.
112
  
 
Despite the fact that its relationship with civil society is increasing, it is, at times, pathetic. For 
instance, a cash-strapped Ethiopian Human Rights Council, a veteran human rights NGOs 
critical of the government, was forced to scale back its operation by closing down its branch 
offices and reducing its staff following the entry into force of the new legislation on civil 
society organizations. In dire financial need, it reached an agreement, in 2011, with the 
Commission with a view to getting 1.2 Million Birr financial support to revive its work. 
Unfortunately, the agreement has not been honoured. Despite making repeated plea for its 
release, the Council’s attempt fell on deaf ears. Finally, it publicly released the non-
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implementation of the agreement to the media. The two institutions could not sit together to 
sort out the problem and their narratives over the bickering are conflicting.
113
 The controversy 
highlights its shaky relation with NGOs critical of the government. 
 
6.4. Open defence of the Human Rights Record of the Government: Acting as a 
Mouth-piece of the Government? 
 
The Commission does not have smooth relations with international human rights NGOs. It 
appears to be driven by the perception of the government to them, immersing itself into 
strident anti-NGO rhetoric of the government. It is not receptive to human rights abuses 
documented and released by them as the recent spat with Human Rights Watch reveals. 
Reports issued by the Human Rights Watch entitled ‘Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure’ and 
‘Development without Freedom’ relating to Ethiopia incensed not only the government but 
also the Commission. They prompted the Commission to release a fierce criticism of both 
reports and to even question the commitment of the organization for the very ideals of human 
rights.
114
 
  
This is not the first time the Commission engaged itself in media campaign to defend the 
government human rights record. Recently, the Commission the Chief Commissioner tried to 
amplify the human rights record of the government upon the country’s selection as member of 
the Human Rights Council. The Chief Commissioner gave an interview on the matter arguing 
that the selection is a sign of improvement in human rights conditions in the country.
115
 
Marking a consistent pattern, the Chief Commissioner, while admitting some human rights 
problems, once again engaged himself in a passionate defence of the track record of the 
government in protecting human rights. This is evident from the recent discussion hosted by 
DW Radio Amharic Service over the current human rights problems in the country.
116
 As the 
institution is not a mouthpiece of the government it was supposed to monitor, criticize and 
offer independent assessment and opinion for the enhancement of human rights conditions in 
the country rather than defending the record of the government per se. 
 
6.5. Lack of Transparency 
 
In order to be truly independent, NHRIs have to be transparent in all its overall activities. 
Doing so or otherwise indicates the extent to which the Commission is enforcing good 
governance in its own operation. 
 
Publication of the findings and recommendations of NHRIs in annual reports and/or special 
reports forms part of promotional work in itself and thereby spurs potential complainants to 
lodge their complaints. Let alone in annual reports, the Commission does usually not provide 
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the victims with a copy of the outcome of investigation, which includes a summary of its 
findings on the case and the remedies it recommends. 
 
Contrary to the Federal Constitution and the enabling statute of the Commission promoting 
publicity, confidentiality is the norm in the practice of the Commission, mirroring the reality 
vexing all public institutions. The Commission seems to have absorbed the nation’s culture of 
concealment, non-disclosure and introversion. It tends to consider all cases under its review to 
be strictly confidential and is not, as a result, required to provide such information to third 
parties. Some vibes that reinforces the Commission’s stance in this regard is found in the 
enabling statute, which talks of observance of secrecy.
117
 Given the wide-spread culture of 
secrecy and non-disclosure in the country, such provision would absolve non-transparency, 
spoiling a culture of openness from emerging. 
 
Lack of transparency shields the Commission internal workings from the public, individuals, 
media and others who want to assess its performance, undermining public accountability of 
the institution. 
  
6.6. Informal Mode of Enforcement 
 
The modus operandi of the Commission is more informal in nature, especially in relation to 
enforcing recommendation. It has been using a non-confrontational and informal mode of 
enforcement. The Commission has not opted to use naming and shaming, particularly in its 
annual report. Actually, formal enforcement powers in the form of ‘name and shame’ through 
publicity may not, as argued by commentators, work in an authoritarian state with a controlled 
media and a frail judiciary.
118
 In authoritarian tradition, an approach grounded in quiet 
diplomacy helps to keep the channels of communication open.
119
  
 
As the Commission is a formal institution and human rights protection is meant to challenge 
governmental powers, reliance on informal modus operandi has thwarted it from exercising 
formal institutional muscle to confront government agents. Heavy reliance on informal means 
puts the Commission’s credibility at risk. It increases a perception that the institution lacks 
ability to even deploy its inherent enforcement instruments notwithstanding that it has 
actually been assisting the victims. 
 
7. Challenges 
 
Some of the challenges impeding the effective and independent functioning of the 
Commission in achieving its overall objectives are outlined in this section. The lists of 
challenges are not exhaustive but are indicative of the key and major ones. 
 
 
 7.1. Independent Functioning Challenges: Appointment Procedure Shortcoming and 
Dubious Public Attitude 
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There is a low level of commitment on the part of governments in transition for the protection 
of human rights. This is the case, for instance, in African countries.
120
 The officials in power 
are even the ones at forefront when it comes to supporting human rights violations.
121
 The 
politicians are therefore in most cases the spoilers of many initiatives to promote and protect 
human rights on the continent.
122
 Those in power may find a throng of ways to impede the 
functioning of NHRIs.
123
 This makes NHRIs endeavour to build a culture of respect for 
human rights an uphill struggle against entrenched practice and mind-set.  
 
To better discharge their functions, NHRIs need to develop a good linkage with government 
agencies, NGOs and others while maintaining their independence. Maintaining independence 
and fending off meddling particularly from the government, which set up and fund NHRIs, is 
one of the key challenges for the effectiveness of the institutions.
124
 To foster their 
independence, NHRIs should be given requisite resources, autonomy and power to discharge 
their supposedly broad mandate optimally. This is a challenging task in developing countries, 
especially in Africa, firstly, the supposedly independent institutions are actually likely to be 
subject to the influence of government in power, and secondly where resources are scare.
125
 
 
Tampering with appointment procedure is one of the means used by governments in transition 
to democracy to influence the operation of NHRIs. To ensure the independent appointment of 
officials, the law sets up an independent Committee, the ‘Nomination Committee’, the 
composition of which does not, strictly speaking, include NGOs or civil society proper.
126
 In 
fact, the enabling law does not stipulate any fundamental procedure or working method of the 
‘Nominating Committee’, making it an obscure body. In practice, it invites the general public 
to submit suitable candidates they think qualify to run the institution. However, the process is 
not truly open and participatory. Put it differently, the Committee does not allow the public in 
general and the civil society in particular to debate on the list of nominees either, carrying out 
the nomination behind closed doors. Moreover, no interview is conducted with the would-be 
officials of the institution. The absence of such procedures opens room for potential 
manipulation of the appointment process in favour of candidates affiliated to the government 
of the day, posing the biggest challenge to the overall operation and thereby the independent 
standing of the Commission right from the very beginning. That is why there is a degree of 
suspicion regarding the independence of the first and existing batch of Commissioners from 
the government and party politics. The Commission is perceived to be weak and not truly 
independent of the government upon its establishment as well as in its operation.
127
 Major 
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civil society organizations, opposition groups, private media and international human rights 
NGOs have little faith in the organization, perceiving it as the lackey of the government.
128
 
For instance, critical of its hitherto performance, Human Rights Watch dubs the Commission 
a ‘government-affiliated’ body, lacking independence.129  Deputation of senior officials to the 
Commission from the executive agencies or council from the very inception further reinforces 
the concern of independence. Most heads of departments were not directly recruited through a 
merits-based process.
130
  
 
If partial, not competent and politically-affiliated officials assume office of NHRIs, it will 
damage the credibility and legitimacy of the institution and thereby blight the enthusiasm of 
the public to have recourse to the institution unless they prove their real independence in 
practice
131
 This was the case in Indonesia at its infant stage where people close to the regime 
were appointed to run the commission in the country but the Commission managed to win 
back the credibility of the public because of its outspoken criticism of the government and 
independent investigation.
132
  
 
Apart from the perception of institutions lacking enforcement powers, there is a general 
cynicism to public institutions in general and the ones dealing with human rights in particular. 
One of the key factors complicating its work is, according to the Commission’s own words, 
the existence among the public of a degree of cynicism or lack of faith in the initiatives of 
public authorities in relation to the promotion and protection of human rights in general and 
the tendency to distrust the investigation carried by such bodies.
133
 One case putting the 
independence as well as public cynicism towards investigations by public institutions, 
including the Commission, is the Aregawi Yohannes Case, a case involving the murder of an 
opposition party member prior to the general election in 2010. 
 
The opposition parties allegedly attributed the death to the government security forces, 
claiming that the killing was part of an intimidation campaign by the government against 
opposition parties. The Commission visited the site of death and conducted interviews with 
the police handling the case, witnesses, local administrative officials, and members of the 
party of the deceased.
134
 After investigation, it concluded that the death was a result of a bar 
brawl that broke out between the deceased and the perpetrator and was not a politically-
motivated incident. The report was in favour of the prior repeated statement made by the 
government regarding the incident. It was out rightly rejected by the opposition group, 
accusing the Commission of not being independent of the government.
135
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At this juncture, it is however important to make some remark regarding the handling by the 
Commission of the aforementioned case. The Commission decided to investigate the incident 
on the basis of its own motion. It seized the matter following claims and counter-claims made 
by the government and opposition groups regarding the incident. Its objective was to give an 
independent account of the case to the general public.
136
 Though its stated objective was a 
good one, one could raise doubts as regards to its jurisdiction to investigate the matter in the 
first place. By the time it commenced investigation, the case had already been resolved by a 
court ruling - the perpetrator was charged, convicted and sentenced to a 15-year 
imprisonment. As per the enabling legislation, the Commission may not investigate matters 
pending before a court. It may not, a fortiori, investigate a matter that has already been settled 
by court. Opening room for speculation, it is not clear as to why the Commission investigated 
the matter in the first place.
137
 
 
While the independence as well as motive of the Commission in the case at hand may be 
questioned, an indiscriminate statement to discredit the Commission altogether might affect 
the appetite of people who may seek its service. To avoid a sweeping statement that rejects 
the Commission’s work, one should put its contribution in perspective by putting its 
undertakings in promotional and protection activities. The source of the doubt in relation to its 
independent functioning and drive in this particular case partly emanates from the cynicism 
and tendency to distrust investigation by government entities in general, extending even to 
courts.
138
 Reinforcing the cynicism, there is a traditional perception held by the public that 
courts of law are an extension of state power rather than a law-enforcement body to protect 
citizens.
139
 Probably, the pervasive atrocities perpetrated by the successive regimes against 
citizens and the lack of effective independent accountability mechanisms for long might 
justify such scepticism to public institutions meant to protect individuals and groups against 
government authorities. 
 
Although gradually increasing, the low number of cases handled by the Commission is, on top 
of ignorance of human rights, partly attributed to, among others, such perception and 
cynicism. It makes consistent promotion of human rights and independent investigation by the 
Commission of complaints important. 
 
7.3.  Financial and Human Resource Constraints 
 
Democratic institutions in Ethiopia are not at the top of budget earmarked annually for 
different spending, with the huge chunk going to infrastructure development, education and 
military and security sectors. While these sectors are undoubtedly important for the stability 
and peace and development of the country, democratic institutions that hold the government 
to account and also cater for the dignity of citizens do not feature high in the spending list. 
The scarcity of and orientation to resource allocation could affect the operations of the 
democratic institutions in the country. It has a repercussion to the bid of the institutions, 
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including the Commission, in operating optimally to promote and protect human rights given 
their wide mandate. 
 
Although the budget of the Commission has seen progressive increase over the years, it is not 
adequate enough in the face of the wide mandate bestowed to it. The problem is acute as a 
multi-donor funding project, under the rubric of ‘Democratic Institution Program’ 
administered by the UNDP, has ceased, putting some of its encouraging endeavours at risk of 
downgrading at best and closure in the worst scenario.  
 
Regarding human resources, the recruitment of competent staff is a major area of concern, 
which greatly impacted the effectiveness of the Commission.
140
 Maintaining a serious 
program of staff development is challenging owing to shortage of funding. Realizing this 
problem right from the start, donor agencies and international organizations have rushed 
financial and technical support to the Commission, enhancing its capacity. Although staff 
capacity has gradually been improving over the years, the Commission still faces shortage of 
competent staff in analysis of, among others, laws and policies, and allocation and spending 
of government budget.
141
 A stumbling-block affecting the hiring of competent staff is the 
salary scale, which is not attractive enough.
142
 
 
 7.4. Accessibility Challenge 
 
Widespread poverty and inequality contribute to entrenching systemic discrimination, posing 
greatest challenge for NHRIs to contribute to creating a culture of respect for human rights 
and tackling discrimination.
143
 Militating against access to NHRIs, the majority of African 
people live in rural area under abject poverty, ignorance and lack of awareness about human 
rights, making the activities of the institutions an epic task.
144
 In such settings, making the 
presence of the institutions felt to the public and encouraging people to resort to the 
institutions is a colossal activity that needs huge resources, which may not be at the disposal 
of the institutions in the developing world, limiting their work and achievement.  
 
Although the Commission has over the years been improving its accessibility, through a 
combination of decentralization, sustained promotional works and provision of legal aid 
service, access to the largest segment of the population is undercut by financial constraints, 
and by its inability to open planned additional branch offices as well as its limited interaction 
with civil society working at a grass-root level.  
 
The website of the Commission is not regularly updated with reports and activities and not 
reviewed for recommendations. This has inhibited access to information on what the 
institution is undertaking and plans to carry out. In fact, this problem is closely related to the 
lack of transparency marking the Commission’s operation. 
 
7. 5. Failure to Adhere to Strategic Operational Procedure 
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Another notable problem affecting the operation of the Commission is its failure to adhere to 
its own strategic plan. It seems to be driven by events instead of planned activities. At times, 
it drops planned activities for the sake of pursuing new activities not envisaged in the list of 
activities supposed to be undertaken. In some cases, it abandons planned activities so that it 
could focus on monitoring elections.
145
 In other cases, the lack of capacity prevents it from 
undertaking planned activities.
146
 As a result, the Commission frequently carries forward 
promotional works and complaint investigation supposed to be completed in one fiscal year to 
another. This is against the very purpose of the strategic plan, which is meant for proper 
functioning and to avoid unplanned and uncoordinated actions. 
 
 7.6. Credibility Challenge-the Status of the Commission 
 
The notion of NHRIs is a new phenomenon in Ethiopia. The Commission was set up as part 
of a constitutional reform venture to usher in a new era of democratic governance based on 
the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is likely that its work is caught between two 
sets of expectations. From the public side, there could be unrealistic expectations that the 
Commission would address human rights problems in a short period of time. From a human 
rights defenders perspective, the Commission is expected to assume an active role in 
defending human rights. While meeting these expectations is inevitably difficult for it, the 
Commission’s experience is rather not impressive. 
 
Investigating sensitive matters and transparency are among important elements helping 
NHRIs to assert their independent status and bolster their credibility. The limitation in this 
regard has eroded the Commission’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public, hindering it from 
being seen as an independent protector of human rights. 
 
The Commission is far from where it is supposed to be. Cramped by internal and external 
factors, the Commission has not been able to define its place and status in the legal and 
political system. It suffers from loss of authority in relation to government authorities. By, 
inter alia, probing challenging government actions and opening itself up to the public (i.e., by 
reporting its results publicly), it may improve its credibility in the eyes of the general public. 
 
8. Prospect of Favourable Condition for the Operation of the Commission 
 
Potentially reversing its lack of proactivism, the Commission has been engaged in 
investigating the impact of large-scale land transfer to investors. Also, the Commission 
intends to launch systemic studies into religious conflicts with a view to advising the 
government on tackling such problem and deadly violence that arise therefrom.
147
 If the 
outcome of the study is going to be presented for public discussion, it could reshape public 
view regarding such matter, which in the long-run might shape policy on it. 
 
In a recent blunt discussion aired on TV with the Parliament and senior officials of the 
government, democratic institutions accused the government officials and institutions of 
letting them down by not heeding their plea for cooperation and not acting on their 
recommendations. The Speaker of the House of People’s Representatives suggested that 
Parliament will, for the first time, push for the removal of government officials who fail to 
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deliver their functions effectively and who ignore accountability to democratic institutions.
148
 
As Parliament is dominated by one party, such open discussion could help facilitate the 
enforcement of their opinions if the government follows through with its statements. 
 
Also, Parliament has recently been active in monitoring government institutions. It has been 
putting serious questions challenging government officials presenting their annual 
performance reports. While it did a watershed move in blocking the government proposal to 
withdraw the immunity of one of its members, it faced a setback. The proposal was once 
again tabled before it in its next session where the original decision was reversed in an 
unprecedented manner.
149
 Despite this, the emerging proactive role of Parliament helps to 
provide a prospect to facilitate the work of the Commission if Parliament manages to keep the 
pace. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Commission is currently not fulfilling its mandate in a variety of crucial ways. While it 
undoubtedly makes important contributions in promoting human rights and in addressing 
some specific human rights cases, it routinely fails to provide remedies for alleged human 
rights abuses attributable to government authorities. To skip investigation and provision of 
remedies in politically sensitive matters, it disclaims jurisdiction in instances. Also, it fails to 
launch systemic investigation into important human rights issues and recommended reforms 
required to curb policies and practices that trample on human rights. In addition, it could not 
effectively collaborate with key human rights advocates in the government, civil society, and 
international community. On the whole, the Commission has failed to live up to the degree 
expected of it in defending human rights. 
 
While the difficult political environment with a slow transition to a democratic dispensation 
and a considerable legacy of authoritarianism and a strong government to contend with poses 
challenges to its works, it equally makes its promotional and protection functions more 
demanding. 
 
The Commission should not shy away from taking on sensitive matters. In that regard, it has 
to adopt a set of procedural rules on such matters. Also, the Commission need to be 
forthcoming in becoming more transparent and open to the public. It has to provide parties 
with copies of final opinions made by the Commission and remedies suggested. In addition, it 
ought to rely more on formal powers and less on informal ways of getting things done. More 
reliance on informal mode of engagement further erodes it credibility. 
 
It is yet to witness the independent functioning and commitment of the Commission as 
regards important human rights issues. The Commission has built staff and almost all 
operational manuals, rules and procedures are put in place. Starting from scratch, it has now 
taken the shape of a full-fledged institution and also acquired some experience in the 
promotional and protection activities. If independent-minded, competent and courageous 
leadership assume office, it may re-orient itself and turn into truly defending human rights. 
This can be achieved by revisiting and introducing amendment to the selection and 
appointment procedure to ensure that such officials hold office.  
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